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Power, the State, Multilateral Diplomacy, and Global Governance

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As many of our contributors have observed in this book, the issues surrounding state sovereignty and the use of national power to advance state interests are nothing new in world history. The Westphalian system of states created after 1648, if anything, has only exacerbated the inherent conflict between sovereignty and multilateral diplomacy and between sovereignty and the concept and reality of global governance.

The increase in the number of independent nation-states after World War II, the creation of the United Nations, and the establishment of hundreds of intergovernmental organizations[1] have all dramatically expanded the opportunities for multilateral diplomacy and created opportunities for global governance.[2] Nevertheless, the assertion of state sovereignty is still a major factor in whether or not states will participate in multilateral diplomatic efforts and work through international organizations and institutions to deal with and resolve the complex and difficult problems confronting the international community in the twenty-first century.

Ambassador Joseph Melrose and Andrew Melrose remind us in this volume that the United Nations, after all, was only designed to be a collection of sovereign states that occasionally delegate collective authority to that body. They also point out that "Nothing in the [UN] charter explicitly authorized action in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the state" (see Chapter 4). Also in this volume, however, Stephen Rock observes that state sovereignty need not always preclude swift action by the international community. The detonation of a nuclear device in 2006 by North Korea, widely regarded as a "rogue state,"

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resulted in an almost immediate response by the UN Security Council, which adopted a resolution critical of North Korea's action and also sanctioned the regime in Pyongyang (see Chapter 5).

John Rourke and Mark Boyer (2008, 141) offer several reasons for when and why multilateral diplomacy is employed and the global consequences when it either fails or is not utilized. They believe that the advent of technology has made us more aware of problems within and among nations. Absent modern communication, how many people would be interested in human rights violations in China and Zimbabwe, the use of torture by the United States in Iraq or Guantánamo, or the AIDS crisis in South Africa? Rourke and Boyer also cite problems, such as global climate change, that by their very nature must lend themselves to multilateral action and possible solutions. The empowerment of smaller states by collective action is another impetus, they suggest, for multilateral diplomacy, although the influence of these states may be more rhetorical than real. Finally, they note that global diplomacy and actions were conspicuously absent and global governance failed when the George W. Bush administration invaded Iraq in March 2003. Without concerted action by the global community, as in the first Gulf war (1990–1991), the "coalition of the willing" (used to describe UN peacekeeping operations since the early 1990s) in Iraq became the "coalition of the piddling," with only the British contributing significant military forces and offering major diplomatic backing.

In this chapter, I briefly explore several case studies regarding state sovereignty and national power, multilateral diplomacy, and global governance. The cases involve a major success for concerted diplomatic and military action through the United Nations, the 1990–1991 Gulf War; one of the more conspicuous failures with devastating consequences, the genocide in Rwanda in 1994; and the ongoing efforts by the international community to restrain Iran in its efforts either to build nuclear weapons or to allow the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes (Iran's stated position). I will also offer some insights about the future of multilateral diplomacy and global governance in the twenty-first century.

The 1990–1991 War in the Persian Gulf

On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. The UN Security Council, determining that a breach of international peace and security existed as a result of the invasion and acting under Articles 39 and 40 of the UN Charter, adopted twelve major resolutions from August 1990 through November 1990. These resolutions con-

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demned Iraq and demanded its immediate withdrawal from Kuwait (Security Council Resolution 660, the first resolution) and imposed mandatory sanctions against Iraq; finally, Resolution 678 (the last resolution) authorized "member states cooperating with the government of Kuwait . . . to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Security Council Resolution 660 and all subsequent resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area."

Why was multilateral diplomacy so successful in the Gulf War, and why did the usual suspects, state sovereignty and national interests, not prevail?

With the end of the Cold War and a greatly weakened Soviet Union (the country did not collapse until December 1991), there was no ideological barrier or great power struggle to prevent collective security from being employed as envisioned by the UN Charter. The United States had neutralized a possible Chinese veto in the Security Council by President George H. W. Bush's opposition to (and vetoes of) sanctions imposed by the U.S. Congress over the massacre at Tiananmen Square in 1989. China either voted with the United States or abstained in the Security Council. Saddam Hussein's actions frightened the more conservative Arab states (and the wealthiest) so that there was no support for Iraq except from Jordan and Libya. Hussein obviously received no support from his enemies in Syria and Iran. In addition, none of the twelve Security Council resolutions called for the overthrow of the Iraqi leader. This allowed the anti-Hussein coalition to remain united (i.e., they all agreed he had to get out of Kuwait or be thrown out); only some UN members, such as the United States, had other longer-term goals. Unlike the Korean War, the various forces that participated in Operations Desert Shield and Storm did not come under the command of the United Nations. They were all ultimately placed under American command because the United States was the dominant military force in the military coalition against Iraq. The problems of national sovereignty and command and control, then, were never at issue.[3]

As part of the cease-fire agreement, Iraq agreed to disclose the "locations, amounts, and types" of biological and chemical weapons it possessed and to furnish similar information about ballistic missiles with a range of more than 150 kilometers. Iraq agreed to destroy these weapons and to accept ongoing international supervision through a UN special commission (UNSCOM). Security Council Resolution 687 also called for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection of Iraq's nuclear facilities. Sanctions would be lifted when Iraq destroyed these weapons under appropriate UN and IAEA supervision. Iraq did not comply and eventually kicked out the IAEA and the UNSCOM inspectors.

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Critics contended that Hussein undermined the United Nations by successfully flouting its authority. U.S. and British warplanes, however, continued to enforce no-fly zones in the northern and southern parts of the country. In short, multilateral diplomatic efforts failed, neoconservatives in the United States argued, and the United States had no choice but to act in March 2003. Moreover, the United Nations was in danger, President George W. Bush charged in February 2003 prior to the war, of becoming "an irrelevant, debating society" if it did not enforce its own resolutions on disarming Iraq. The sanctions were lifted only after "regime change" in Iraq resulted in the removal of Hussein and his cohorts from power.

Thus, the Gulf War, although a successful effort in the use of multilateral diplomacy and military power, proved not to be a model for future UN collective-security actions (or, as President George H. W. Bush proclaimed at the time, "a New World Order"), because the George W. Bush administration adopted what became known as the "Bush Doctrine" based on the United States' essentially taking unilateral actions internationally and acting preemptively after 9/11. As the only remaining superpower, the United States would not feel constrained to act when its vital interests and national security were threatened, the Bush administration argued, even if many of America's allies and a majority of UN members opposed the action (the Iraq War). The economic collapse in 2008 and the reluctance of the American public to support America's "forgotten wars" may reflect what historian Paul Kennedy (1987) described as "imperial overstretch." He argued that history is replete with examples of dominant world powers engaging in self-destructive behavior because of their external wars and commitments. This behavior eventually resulted in the decline of "great powers" because their adventures abroad ultimately diminished their economic and military strength and their political influence.

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The 1994 Genocide in Rwanda

In 1994, the United Nations failed to act in Rwanda when the Hutu majority began a systematic slaughter, or genocide, of the minority Tutsi. In one hundred days' time, between April and July, an estimated 800,000 people were killed. The murder rate was five times faster than anything the Nazis did before or during World War II. The United Nations failed to act because it was "another African bloody war" and because the United States and the Western powers were reluctant to intervene after the debacle in Somalia in 1994 (even though a relatively small UN force, many believe, would have prevented the slaughter). It was, as Edmund Burke once wrote, a situation in which "evil triumphs when good men do nothing."

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The 1999 Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda concluded in part, "The failure by the United Nations to prevent, and subsequently, to stop the genocide in Rwanda was a failure by the United Nations system as a whole. The fundamental failure was the lack of resources and political commitment devoted to developments in Rwanda and to the United Nations presence there. There was a persistent lack of political will by Member States to act, or to act with enough assertiveness" (United Nations 1999, 3).

There are still arguments in some quarters that a rescue mission by the international community through the United Nations would have required over 100,000 troops, an altogether unrealistic goal. Gen. Romeo Dallaire, the UN commander in Rwanda, disputes this contention. He continues to claim that a small UN peacekeeping force would have saved thousands of lives. This much is not in dispute. The 1999 independent inquiry report was correct (i.e., for whatever reasons, the United Nations did not act before or during the genocide). Alan Kuperman also suggests, "If the West is unwilling to deploy . . . robust forces [in advance of a humanitarian disaster], it [also] must refrain from coercive diplomacy" because of an often "tragic backlash" (2000, 117).

Why did the United Nations not act? Was it another example of states being unwilling to intervene in another state's internal affairs because of precedents that could be used against so many nations that have deplorable human rights records? Was it about unintended consequences, "crossing the Mogadishu line," as was the case with UN intervention in Somalia in 1992? Or was it a reflections of Senator Robert Dole's statement that "I don't think we have any national interest here [in Rwanda]. I hope we don't get involved there"? And, by extension, did the powers that be in other states come to the same conclusion? A more cynical, but perhaps more realistic, view of humanitarian interventions has been offered by political scientist Ronald Steel: "Intervention (by the UN) will occur where it can be done relatively cheaply, against a weak nation, in an area both accessible and strategic, where the public's emotions are aroused, and where it does not get in the way of other political, economic or military needs" (1999).

In Chapter 6 of this volume, Donna Schlagheck also observes that "state sovereignty continues to thwart development of an effective and rapid response to genocide." However, by contrast, when a state's existence is threatened by the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a rogue state or by terrorism, states, she argues, are more likely to "collaborate" in dealing with these perceived life-and-death issues.

I would suggest that all of these factors came into play when the international community essentially ignored the ensuing disaster, even though many governments

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and their intelligence agencies were fully aware of what was happening in Rwanda. Many states continued to assert the Westphalian principle of nonintervention based on state sovereignty. An interesting twist is provided by Singapore's Kishore Mahbubani (2008), who has made a case that the West's insistence on promoting and protecting human rights is an ill-disguised effort to impose Western values on non-Western societies. President Bill Clinton, who inherited a U.S. military commitment as part of a UN peacekeeping force from his predecessor, President George H. W. Bush, acquiesced when Congress legislated that all U.S. troops had to be withdrawn from Somalia in order to avoid a repetition of the incidents involving the murder in Mogadishu of American troops who were part of the UN peacekeeping mission. They got into harm's way when the United States concluded that nation building was an essential element in preventing a repetition of what had previously occurred in Somalia and what had initially prompted UN intervention. Senator Dole spoke for many Americans who could not have found Somalia on a map if their lives depended on it. Why risk American lives with an intervention without a clear cut U.S. political, strategic, or economic interest? Lastly, Professor Steel may be correct in that the situation in Rwanda was complex and involved, and it would have been difficult at best to stop the warring factions in a civil conflict from continuing to kill each other. In the final analysis, no one really cared until it was too late, and Rwanda's coffee crop hardly qualified as an irreplaceable resource.[4]

The Iranian Nuclear-Program Crisis

Iran's national objectives and strategies are shaped by its regional political aspirations, threat perceptions, and the need to preserve its Islamic government. Mohsen Milani points out that "in fact, Tehran's foreign policy [is] . . . based on Iran's ambitions and Tehran's perception of what threatens them. Tehran's top priority is the survival of the Islamic Republic" (2009, 46).

In the past, and within the framework of its national goals, Iran gave high priority to expanding its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and missile programs. Thus, in 1991 Ayatollah Mohajerani, one of then president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's deputies, said in a statement widely quoted online that "since the enemy has atomic capabilities, Islamic countries must be armed with the same capacity."

The Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), the worst war in modern Middle Eastern history, exposed Iranian military and strategic weakness and vulnerability, for

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which a nuclear weapons capability could compensate. Iran's emphasis on pursuing independent production capabilities for special weapons and missiles was driven by its experience in the war, during which it was unable to respond adequately to Iraqi chemical and missile attacks and suffered the effects of an international arms embargo. The war was probably the greatest influence on Iran's decision to pursue special weapons capabilities.

In his 2003 State of the Union address, President Bush labeled Iran as part of an "axis of evil" along with Iraq and North Korea. From its perspective Iran concluded that nuclear weapons could prove useful, therefore, in deterring the United States, and a nuclear weapons capability could constitute a balance to Israel. Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who first took office in 2005 and was reelected in a much disputed election in 2009, has repeatedly emphasized that Iran has the right to peacefully use nuclear energy and that Iran will act to protect its security against the Great Satan, meaning the United States. In December 2009, *The Economist* noted, "Iran is much further on with its enrichment plans. . . . [It] has done warhead development, besides other experiments whose purpose can only be to build a nuclear weapon, or enable one to be assembled at speed."[5]

The foundation of the nuclear nonproliferation regime has been the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in effect since 1970 and renewed indefinitely in 1995. NPT signatories are legally bound to fulfill specific obligations to prevent proliferation. In the view of many Western governments, although Iran remains a signatory to the treaty, it has sought nuclear weapons in violation of its nonproliferation and safeguards obligations under the NPT. In fact, inspectors from the IAEA, the NPT's enforcement arm, have warned that Iran's nuclear-enrichment efforts are in an "advanced state of construction" (quoted in *The Economist* 2009). Fareed Zakaria reminds us that Iran "has a right to civilian nuclear energy, as do all nations. But Tehran has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, submitting itself to the jurisdiction of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA says Iran has exhibited a pattern of deception and non-cooperation involving its nuclear program for 20 years—including lying about its activities and concealing sites" (2009).

Charles D. Ferguson notes,

> To make nuclear fuel, an enrichment facility is not enough. A country needs adequate supplies of natural uranium to begin the process. Also, it needs a fuel fabrication facility to turn the enriched uranium into fuel that can be placed inside the core of a nuclear reactor. Iran has

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> neither. . . . Therefore, Iran cannot run a peaceful nuclear program alone. In order to build commercial nuclear reactors, Iran must rely on the major reactor producers, including France, Russia, and the U.S.—some of the same countries working to prevent Iran from making nuclear bombs. It must also rely on international suppliers of natural uranium and international fuel fabrication facilities. (2008, 9)

UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) requires all states to enact and enforce legal and regulatory measures against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by state and nonstate actors. The United States and the United Kingdom have called for implementation of Resolution 1540, which declares that all member states "resolve to take appropriate and effective actions against any threat to international peace and security caused by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, in conformity with its primary responsibilities, as provided for in the United Nations Charter . . . [and to support] multilateral treaties whose aim is to eliminate or prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons."

Leslie H. Gelb (2009) has argued that even great powers such as the United States must work with other nations in order to build coalitions to confront and respond to global problems. The Lone Ranger approach so famously adopted and employed by the George W. Bush administration never really worked, as evidenced by the disastrous 2003 war in Iraq. With the end of this very brief "unipolar moment,"[6] working with other countries may be the only effective way to deal with a potential disaster resulting from a nuclear-armed Iran.

How should the international community respond to Iran? Using the framework for governance recommended above (common interests, leadership by major powers, and effective enforcement mechanisms), there are possible alternatives to a preemptive strike by the United States, Israel, or both, and the consequences that would necessarily result.

First, there has to be a consensus among the great and interested powers. They include Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia, and the United States. In December 2009, a senior Russian diplomat observed, "We will not stand aside" if others agree on sanctions. At least initially, this requires that the major powers disavow regime change in Tehran and offer trade and contact incentives to the Iranian government.

Second, the major powers must be clear and resolute in their determination to prevent Iran from becoming armed with nuclear weapons. In 2009, the IAEA's

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board voted 25–3, with the support of both China and Russia, to censure Iran for its latest safeguards breaches and to refer the matter, yet again, to the UN Security Council. This means that the major powers must present a united front on Iran, and they must be willing to support additional and harsher sanctions if warranted by Tehran's intransigence and its continued defiance of the Security Council and a united global community. In addition, the United States must lean hard on Israel to discourage a preemptive strike against Iran. Ariel Ilan Roth suggests that the "Israelis know better than anyone else that the trick to developing a nuclear weapon as a small power is to drag out the process of diplomacy and inspections long enough to produce sufficient quantities of fissionable material" (2009).

Nevertheless, he discounts this potential development because "Tehran's expanding influence in Iraq and the fear that it inspires in the Persian Gulf states are already advancing the first goal. Iran needs only to possess nuclear weapons, not to use them, in order to further enhance its international prestige and force adversaries to take it seriously" (2009).

The United States must also consider reevaluating its policy toward Iran essentially since the hostage crisis of 1979. It is unlikely, given the current state of American domestic politics, that full U.S. engagement with Iran is a viable option. Some scholars, however, have suggested that opening the door to cultural and educational exchanges, developing economic relationships on a small-scale basis, and encouraging political dialogues and contacts, especially with opposition Iranian domestic political actors, may be a good start by the United States in an effort to normalize relations between the two countries. In short, the United States must begin to think about détente with Iran and reject the "axis of evil" approach favored by George W. Bush and Dick Cheney.

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An important note here involves the role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), particularly those involved in human rights issues, regarding Iran. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Fédération International des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme have been outspoken in their condemnation of the Iranian government's efforts to suppress continuing opposition to the results of the June 2009 presidential election. This NGO focus on Iran is important, should continue, and must be encouraged and supported. NGOs have an enormously productive role to play in global governance.

Third, the recommendations of the IAEA must be supported by the UN Security Council. A nuclear-armed Iran is in no nation's interest, including Iran's. And, as former president Richard Nixon used to say, this must be made "perfectly clear" to all of the parties involved. Any additional sanctions imposed by the

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Security Council against Iran must be targeted so that the Iranian government and those associated with it are directly effected and not the Iranian people.

The Future: State Power and Global Governance

So, what is the future of state power and global governance through intergovernmental organizations in this new century? Will we ever experience even a reasonable balance between state sovereignty and national power (often unilaterally asserted, for example, by the Americans in countries such as Iraq or the Russians in nations such as Georgia) and global governance as a means through which the international community acts to address global problems and crises? We are certainly aware of the "responsibility to protect," the notion that state sovereignty comes with certain obligations, and the much older notion of "cooperative security," the idea that states need to work together to advance their security goals. We also know that whatever the problems we confront now or in the future, including continuing environmental degradation, terrorism conducted by groups or sponsored by so-called rogue states, or global economic collapse, they all lend themselves to cooperative behavior between and among nation-states and have enhanced the need to build institutions and a framework for global governance. Unilateralism is not dead, but we are aware that America's unilateral war in Iraq made the United States few friends internationally, set back America's national and diplomatic interests, and clearly demonstrated the necessity for multilateral military and diplomatic action (NATO) in other trouble regions of the world, including the war in Afghanistan and the spill over conflict in the border region with Pakistan.

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A Framework for Global Governance

The idea of global governance is nothing new in international politics. In his 1795 essay "Perpetual Peace," Immanuel Kant observed, "Reason without exception absolutely condemns war as a mean of right, and makes a state of peace an absolute duty; and since this peace cannot be effected or be guaranteed without a compact among nations, they must form an alliance of a peculiar kind [a federation]" (Kant 1795, 24–25). Many theorists and political leaders have long supported Kant's contention that global peace and stability rest on "democratic governance" within states, which is the key, in turn, to a "sustainable peace" internationally because democracies are unlikely to make war against other democratic states.

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It should also be noted that a community of interest does not always lend itself to combined diplomatic action, even when national interests converge. The so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) have many common economic concerns, but Russia and China, in particular, often agree only on when to oppose multilateral action regarding countries such as Iran. They rarely engage in united diplomatic action in response to major global issues. In fact, John Lewis Gaddis even suggests that "an expansion of 'poles' within the international system . . . [or] shifts toward bipolarity or multipolarity, are dangerous" (1992, 23). Gaddis also subscribes to Stephen Rock's conclusion that a "state of peace is most likely to emerge among states that are heterogeneous in the exercise of national power . . . in their economic activities, [and] in their societal attributes" (Rock 1989, 12, 15).

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It should be noted, as David Kennett concludes in his contribution to this volume, that there is often no "agreement on the exact nature of the disease and on the appropriate medicine" when it comes to global economic problems (see Chapter 7). The same conclusion is valid when it comes to the myriad of political, social, and economic problems confronting humankind in the twenty-first century.

Wilsonian Democracy and the United Nations

The Wilsonian notion that only democracies could provide a framework for a stable and peaceful world was unintentionally confirmed by the failure of the League of Nations to prevent another global conflict after World War I. The history and the failures of the league, which helped consolidate the coming to power of the European dictators Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini, are well documented. The UN Charter drafted in San Francisco in 1945 reflected a more realistic view of the world as it actually was and not how it ideally should be. The UN Security Council, in particular, was a functional manifestation of what Hans Morgenthau later called "political realism." Nevertheless, this post–World War II concept that the great powers could manage the peace by acting collectively was deeply flawed.

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Stanley Hoffman (1994) points out that identifying an aggressor, subordination of national interests to a greater good, and imposing and enforcing sanctions on nations have often prevented the United Nations from functioning as it was intended by at least some of the fifty-one nations assembled in San Francisco after the war. He also points out that regional organizations "cannot be effective" unless they are supported politically and militarily by a great power. The NATO

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intervention in Afghanistan is a good example of where the effort to isolate and destroy the Taliban and Al Qaeda would not work at all if the United States did not provide the bulk of the military forces involved in the fighting. In addition, collective security as an aspect of global or regional governance is an expensive proposition not only in terms of lives but also in the cost to national taxpayers. The estimated cost to the American taxpayer for 30,000 U.S. troops being deployed to Afghanistan in the coming years, for example, is about $1 million per soldier, or approximately $30 billion annually.

Mark Malloch Brown also suggests, however, that "if members of a society are . . . unable to sit down across various boundaries—ethnic, religious, social, or cultural—and develop common plans" (2003, 142), it is unlikely that their nation will support global efforts to resolve crises and disputes among nations. And, of course, we are always confronted by what Hans Morgenthau characterized as the "anarchic" state of the international political system and the subsequent and continuing struggle for power (and domination) in global politics.

The Case for Global Governance

So, is global governance even a remote possibility in the twenty-first century, or is it a notion debated and discussed by those advocates who, in general, do not understand the real nature of the world in which we live?

In discussing and evaluating a structure for global governance in the twenty-first century, Robert Keohane makes some very useful starting points. He believes that international cooperation, the basis of global governance, does not "necessarily depend on altruism, idealism, personal honor, common purposes, internalized norms, or a shared belief in a set of values embodied in a culture" (1988, 380). Here, we are really referring to a common set of interests as a starting point and as a basis for global governance. In late December 2009, nearly two hundred nations met in Copenhagen, Denmark, to agree on common action in dealing with climate change. The nations assembled included big producing and big polluting nations such as China and the United States, poor nations that claim they bear little or no responsibility for global environmental damage, and nations that are skeptical of the science of climate change, including Saudi Arabia. Whether or not political agreements or effective action eventually emerge depends on bringing together nations that recognize the common long-term dangers and are willing to join with other nations in order to create the global institutional framework necessary to deal with climate change.

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Any real prospect of dealing with reducing greenhouse-gas emissions will ultimately rely on the degree of support for these efforts by China and the United States. This example illustrates a second major factor in global governance. If the United States assumes a leadership role, and if China adopts energy-efficient methods together with slowing the growth of emissions, there is a chance that developing nations can be persuaded to go along as well. In short, the leadership and support of the major powers is a prerequisite for global action. In the final analysis, global governance, as a general principle, depends on support from the world's major economic, military, and political powers that share common interests.

The third major aspect of global governance must involve enforcement. As we know, the devil is always in the details. Political agreements regarding climate change are a beginning, but they must be followed by defined goals and, more importantly, by the creation of enforcement mechanisms. Timothy Longman and Natalie Zähringer point out in Chapter 8 that there is hope regarding enforcement, even when violations of human rights are involved. They believe that not only have minimum standards of "decent treatment" for all human beings "become an increasingly important influence on international affairs," but enforcement, individual accountability, and humanitarian intervention have occurred more frequently and have seriously challenged the principle of state sovereignty. The tragic situation in Haiti in 2010 is an important reminder that the international community, led by the United States in this case, can react positively to a natural disaster with terrible consequences for the people affected.

In summary, three essential aspects of global governance have been identified. In order for global governance to work, common purposes must be identified, the great powers must support measures that are responsive and effective, and the international community must engage in enforcement efforts by supporting and strengthening existing institutions and creating new institutions if necessary, by participating in peacemaking and peacekeeping activities, by upholding sanctions, and by providing the financial resources required to do the job.

Regarding strengthening international institutions, for example, Kishore Mahbubani has observed,

> Democracy, the foundation of government in the West, is based on the premise that each human being in a society is an equal stakeholder in the domestic order. Thus, governments are selected on the basis of "one person, one vote." . . . In order to produce long-term stability and order worldwide, democracy should be the cornerstone of global society, and

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> the planet's 6.6 billion inhabitants should become equal stakeholders. . . . The problem today is that . . . many Western actors . . . are reluctant to strengthen the UN's core institution, the UN General Assembly . . . the most representative body on the planet, and yet many Western countries are deeply skeptical of it. (2008, 123)

Finally, it is important also to remember what can be accomplished when states act in concert through alliances, international organizations and institutions, and multilateral cooperative behavior. *New York Times* writer David Brooks in one of his columns recalled a broadcast on National Public Radio originally recorded the day after Japan surrendered in 1945. An actor was featured who read what Ernie Pyle, the American World War II correspondent, had written about who won the war. Pyle wrote, "We won this war because our men are brave and because of many things . . . because of Russia, England and China. . . . We did not win it because destiny created us better than other peoples" (Brooks 2009). Nationalism and state sovereignty may always be factors in global politics. The real question is whether they can be controlled and channeled to benefit all of humankind or history will continue to repeat itself.

Notes

1. Scholars often use different criteria in identifying IGOs, so the exact number of IGOs is debatable.

2. While definitions of global governance may vary, it is useful to note the following excerpt from the Commission on Global Governance: "Governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest. . . . At the global level, governance has been viewed primarily as intergovernmental relationships, but it must now be understood as also involving non-governmental organizations (NGOs), citizens' movements, multinational corporations, and the global capital market. Interacting with these are global mass media of dramatically enlarged influence. There is no single model or form of global governance, nor is there a single structure or set of structures. It is a broad, dynamic, complex process of interactive decision-making that is constantly evolving and responding to changing circumstances" (1995, 2–3).

3. The United Nations itself considers the action it authorized in the Gulf War to be an example of what it calls "peace enforcement," where the Security Council authorizes member states to "take all necessary measures to achieve a stated objective."

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There is no UN command, and the consent of the warring parties is not necessarily required. Many scholars, however, consider the Gulf War to be an example of the collective-security provisions of the UN Charter.

4. Critics argued that the nation-building effort in Somalia was an either good or bad (and inevitable) example of "mission creep" (i.e., going far beyond the original UN mandate). Others argued that the United Nations had few options in Somalia and only reluctantly became involved in a civil conflict.

5. Quoted in *The Economist* 2009.

6. Charles Krauthammer first wrote about a "unipolar moment" in a *Foreign Affairs* article in 1990. He argued that after the Cold War, the United States being the only remaining superpower, it should act accordingly, and that internationalism had replaced isolationism among the majority of the American public.

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Multilateralism's New Mix: Implications for Diplomacy, International Organizations, and Global Governance

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James P. Muldoon, Jr.

Multilateralism has reached the proverbial crossroad. The world in which it was created and developed has radically and fundamentally changed. From a historical perspective, multilateralism has come to reflect much of what Woodrow Wilson envisioned for a new world order. The array of multilateral structures built since the end of World War II has "brought a measure of law and reciprocity to international politics" and "bred some measure of trust among sovereign states that had eyed each other warily at least since Westphalia" (Kennedy 2010, 93–94). Multilateralism has become an "internalized" norm of interstate relations and a defining characteristic of the international community of independent states. Today, however, the international system is no longer simply about interstate relations and the community of independent sovereign states. Globalization and the global communications revolution have made the world a smaller place, taking interdependence to a significantly new level and changing the patterns of interaction between states, market actors, and civil society on the international level. Hence, the world order that Wilson and others had sought to bring about over the course of the twentieth century does not necessarily reflect the new political, economic, and social landscape of a globalizing international system that has started to unfold in the twenty-first century. This in turn raises the question, Whither multilateralism in this brave new world?

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For the past two decades, scholars and practitioners of international relations have been engrossed by the dramatic global changes that have happened and the impact these changes are having on the structural and functional characteristics of the international system and order. A growing number of scholars and analysts point out that breakthroughs in telecommunications and transportation have undermined state authority by ending the state's monopoly on information; that there is an increasing reliance on nonstate entities, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), for focus and direction, drafting, and implementation of declarations, platforms, and treaties on crucial international issues, including landmines, human rights, and the environment; and that there is a renewed emphasis on working through the UN system to deal with the growing number of intrastate conflicts and new definitions of human security. Many contend that a new world order is both needed and emerging. But, as Henry Kissinger once argued, "[The new world order] is still in a period of gestation, and its final form will not be visible until well into the [twenty-first] century. Part extension of the past, part unprecedented, the new world order, like those which it succeeds, will emerge as an answer to three questions: What are the basic units of the international order? What are their means of interacting? What are the goals on behalf of which they interact?" (1994, 806). Whereas Kissinger remained fixed on states, particularly "continental-type states" (e.g., China, the European Union, India, the Russian Federation, and the United States) as "the basic units of the new world order" (1994, 807), others have realized that globalization and the technological revolution have enabled nonstate actors to become important elements of world order too (cf. Keck and Sikkink 1998; Cutler, Haufler, and Porter 1999; Florini 2000; Mendelson and Glenn 2002; Muldoon 2003; Barnett and Finnemore 2004; DeMars 2005).

As has been pointed out throughout this volume, the role played by nonstate actors in contemporary international relations is an important dimension largely missing in traditional notions of multilateralism, which minimize or ignore nonstate actors' interactions with states and multilateral organizations and their influence on intergovernmental decision making. Due to the dramatic growth and increasing activities of nonstate actors, it is no longer practical to exclude this dimension of global politics. But the answer to the initial question above is not simply to add nonstate actors to the mix; it is more complicated than that since the interactive dynamics between international actors are so fluid and their affects on the institutional and organizational structure of the global system are still unfolding. In addition, at least four important developments in the international system must be taken into account:

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> (1) The existing state system is being transformed into a multi-level pattern of political actors, including macro and microeconomic entities; (2) dominant neo-liberal economic 'globalization' is polarizing rich and poor, included and excluded, both among countries—especially those in Africa—and within societies; (3) threats to people's lives include forces, like the biosphere, which are not contained by territorially based political entities; and (4) current concepts of world order, including Pax Americana and the United States' vaguely articulated preferred new world order, are open to challenge. (Schechter 1999, 2)

Changing Roles, Many Multilateralisms

The last two decades have been a terribly turbulent period for the world, economically, politically, and socially. This has resulted in considerable changes in the way societal actors interact with and relate to each other. States, businesses, and civil society at all levels, from the local to the global, are having to adapt their respective roles to the increasingly complex reality of today's globalizing environment. This, in turn, is shaping the institutional and organizational structure of the international system and global governance. Moreover, as the traditional divides between the private and public and the national and international increasingly blur, the roles played by states, nonstate actors, and international organizations in the governance of the international system are being reconfigured.

In the case of states and their governments, the last twenty years have been particularly rough. Their ability to "control" the forces unleashed by the revolution in information and communications technologies and the effects of globalization has diminished; their resources, financial and otherwise, have declined; and, their authority and legitimacy have been seriously challenged. According to P. Cerny,

> The governments of nation-states are no longer able to make foreign policies autonomously, based primarily on "national interests," whether benevolent or domineering. Nor is foreign policy today about the projection of power, whether "hard" or "soft" (*pace* Joseph Nye and David Milibrand). In a globalizing world it is increasingly about co-operating and co-ordinating both foreign and domestic policies for the purpose of making what international relations theorists call "absolute" or "positive sum" gains. . . . Multilateralism and "civilian superpowers" increasingly trump nationalistic foreign policies in terms of global effectiveness. (2007, 12)

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The role of states has clearly changed since the end of the Cold War, but it is not so much a lesser role as a different one. Although no longer necessarily the sole determinants of the international system, states and the power(s) they continue to wield remain both significant and crucial to the international system's stability and governance. In other words, states are still the dominant actors on the world stage, and the state system continues to be the foundation upon which the emerging global order is being built.

It has also been a tough time for nonstate actors, particularly international business and civil society, primarily due to the changing fortunes of the private sector in the global economy and the rise of "uncivil" society (e.g., Al Qaeda and transnational networks of organized crime). NGOs and civil society groups—an amorphous, fluid, and fractious collectivity of actors—have struggled with the increasing diversity of their ranks and goals, power asymmetries, and funding, resulting in intense competition and fragmentation. Even though NGOs and civil society enjoy high levels of "trust" vis-à-vis government and business in most countries, their legitimacy and accountability have been challenged; this is especially true for humanitarian and development NGOs involved in postconflict areas and in disaster-relief operations (cf. Terry 2002; Juma and Suhrke 2002; Cooley and Ron 2002; DeMars 2005). This has limited their effectiveness and ability to contend in global politics. Likewise, the credibility and influence of international business has been undermined by high-profile corporate scandals (e.g., Enron and Worldcom) and reckless risk taking by global banks and private financial institutions (e.g., American International Group, Goldman Sachs, and Merrill Lynch), which precipitated the current global financial crisis. At the same time, civil society groups, NGOs, and their private-sector counterparts (i.e., multinational corporations and business associations) have graduated from their marginal position within the international system to become key partners and consequential participants in global processes. They no longer simply "lobby" or "inform" governments on global issues and problems but have the resources and capacity to act independently and to protect or promote their own interests and policies. "Civil society organizations as well as corporations have successfully reorganized themselves on a transnational scale, using various forms and varying degrees of influence to make their interests count in international politics. In some cases, transnational non-state interests have managed to almost fully transcend control of nation-states" (Witte, Reinicke, and Benner 2002, 4; Cooper 2002; Langhorne 1998). The role of nonstate actors has definitely grown in the international system, filling in some of the political and economic space that states

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have abandoned or were failing to maintain control over, and despite their limitations or perceived (or actual) deficiencies of accountability, legitimacy, or capability, nonstate actors are indeed "units" of the new world order and proactively involved in defining and setting the goals, rules, and terms of engagement of the international system.

Finally, the effects of global change and pluralized international politics on international organizations have been just as profound. Since the end of the Cold War, international organizations have been struggling to stay abreast of global events and developments, as well as to meet the growing demands made of them for services (e.g., peacekeeping, development, and humanitarian assistance) (Kennedy and Russett 1995). As Paul Diehl has pointed out,

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> The prospects for expanding the roles, functions, and powers of international organizations in global governance seemed bright at the beginning of the 1990s. Yet a series of events underscored the problems and limitations of international organizations as they approached the twenty-first century. . . . [International organizations] now struggle with the new environment and the redefinition of their roles as their original purposes have been significantly altered or rendered obsolete. [They] play a greater role than they ever have in history. Yet we are still reminded that state sovereignty and lack of political will by members inhibit the long-term prospects of those organizations for creating effective structures of global governance. (1997, 3; see also Elliott 2000)

Most importantly, international organizations have had difficulty in balancing their two major roles: forum and service provider. As Robert Cox and Harold Jacobson note,

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> Some organizations are established to provide a forum or framework for negotiations and decisions, others to provide specific services. . . . In reality, of course, many international organizations fall into both categories. ILO, for example, has an extensive technical assistance program, but also provides a framework for the negotiation of International Labor Conventions. Similarly, ITU, UNESCO, WHO, IAEA, and IMF execute services in their own right and at the same time provide frameworks for discussion and negotiations among their member states. (1997, 75–76)

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While the two roles are interrelated, each is distinct, demanding different organizational capabilities—political and diplomatic for the former and managerial for the latter—that are sometimes contradictory and always difficult to link effectively (Dijkzeul and Beigbeder 2003). Although international organizations have been slow to adjust to the shifting patterns of interaction between state and nonstate actors and the new global environment, they have grown stronger, more focused, and more capable as they gradually move away from the fragmented, "silo-ed," decentralized bureaucratic structure toward a more coherent, networked, and coordinated one. Interorganizational dynamics among international organizations are certainly an important dimension of today's multilateral system and reinforce the intermediary role international organizations have and do play in the international system and its governance.

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As these three sets of actors engage one another, their roles are inevitably shaped and altered. Brian Hocking and Dominic Kelly argue that there is "strong impetus" for this engagement, which "affects both governmental and nongovernmental actors in ways which, whilst related, are differentiated by their distinctive organizational characteristics (their 'actorness')":

> In the case of business, this is reflected in the growing concern with corporate citizenship which, by its nature, focuses on redefining a firm's relations with an expanded range of "stakeholders." In the case of governments, it is reflected in the reform of diplomatic services to enhance their interaction with civil society and reinforce and redefine the "public diplomacy" function. In the case of NGOs, it is reflected in debates about purpose, strategies, and engagement with both business and government, and for multilateral organizations, in reaching out beyond the realm of states in a search for funds, expertise, and legitimacy. (2002, 207)

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The interests that each set of actors brings to bear on its relationships with the others, as well as the complex set of interactions between them, contribute to the growing complexity of the international operating environment. These varied interests also reflect the different changes within each set of actors—for example, the power shifts within the interstate system with the rise of new major political and economic powers (e.g., China and India); the rise of transnational movements of civil society and NGO networks, the rise (and fall) of global business power over the global economy, and the trend toward "partnerships" between business and civil society; and the emergence of innovative interorganizational arrange-

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ments and coordinating mechanisms among international organizations—that inform and drive their respective behaviors and goals in the international system and the emerging global order. It is this interactive dynamic that creates myriad constellations of actors in free-flowing networks and ad hoc arrangements that pervade the international policy milieu and animates international institutions and existing and emergent forms of multilateralism.

Multilateralism in its traditional guise as an institutional form of coordination of relations among three or more states is still pertinent to the system of states and international governmental organizations (e.g., the UN system, Bretton Woods institutions, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, and other regional bodies like the Organization of American States, the African Union, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations). The Westphalian order of states is still intact and increasingly relies on institutions of multilateralism to manage the inherent "anarchy" of the interstate system and soften "the rough edges of power" of states (Thakur 2002, 283), especially the great powers, like the Russian Federation or the United States. Even though U.S. policies of the last several years have shaken "the foundations of mutual trust that a half century of multilateral life cemented" and eroded confidence in multilateral institutions, multilateralism provides "the world the very tools it needs most to manage the ever more interdependent global order of the 21st century. It would be folly to abandon those tools, or let them rust through inattention, particularly as new great powers arise to rival the last century's hegemon. To do so would leave all nations, including the United States, markedly less secure" (Kennedy 2010, 94). However, limiting multilateralism to intergovernmental relations creates an incomplete picture of the international system. As James Orbinski argues, "Today, competing and overlapping state alliances and blocks (Chimerica vs. G8/G5 + Egypt vs. G20 vs. UN Fora vs. BRIC), multinational corporations, intergovernmental organizations like the WTO and WHO, transnational public-private partnerships, foundations like Gates, one-man states like Bono, the UN, big and small NGOs, and transnational civil society networks are all powerful forces that shape and reshape contemporary international relations" (2009, 32). Now that crowds of private actors are in the international public arena and so deeply involved in how international public policy is made and implemented, it no longer makes sense to think of multilateralism only in terms of states and interstate relations or of intergovernmental organizations and regimes.

Other multilateralisms are emerging that both challenge and complement the statecentric multilateral system. Shepard Forman and Derk Segaar point out,

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> Just as a multitude of alternative intergovernmental arrangements [e.g., the Group of Twenty or ad hoc coalitions of the willing, multinational forces, and "friends of" arrangements] have emerged to address issues that are presumed to be underattended or mishandled by the formal multilateral institutions, so too have NGOs and multinational corporations sought to expand their influence and inputs into the making of international public policy and the delivery of essential goods and services that national governments and intergovernmental institutions seem unable or unwilling to provide. (2006, 214)

Through multistakeholder arrangements like NGO coalitions and networks, public-private partnerships, and a variety of nonstate forums such as the World Economic Forum, World Social Forum, and the parallel gatherings of NGOs at world conferences and summits, nonstate actors have become an essential part of the international system. Similarly, Thomas Weiss, Tatiana Carayannis, and Richard Jolly argue that the extensive relationships and interaction between nonstate actors and the two United Nations—one composed of member states and the other of the secretariats—have created what they call a third United Nations:

> This "additional" UN consists of certain nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), external experts, scholars, consultants, and committed citizens who work closely with the UN's intergovernmental machinery [the first UN] and secretariats [the second UN]. The third UN's roles include advocacy, research, policy analysis, and idea mongering. Its elements often combine forces to put forward new information and ideas, push for new policies, and mobilize public opinion around UN deliberations and operations. . . . These circles—a third UN—are independent of and provide essential inputs into the other two UNs. Such "outside-insiders" are an integral part of today's United Nations. What once seemed marginal for international relations now is central to multilateralism. (2009, 123)

Multistakeholder arrangements and multisector networks offer an alternative approach for transnational problem-solving. According to Jan Witte, Wolfgang Reinicke, and Thorsten Benner, "Multisector networks create bridges on a transnational scale among the public sector (national, regional or state, and local governments as well as inter-governmental groups), the private sector and civil society. They (a) reflect the changing roles and relative importance among them; (b) pull diverse groups and resources together; and (c) address issues that no group

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can solve by itself" (2002, 10). Nonstate actors and international secretariats have turned to these new forms and structures of multilateralism primarily out of frustration with the inflexibility of states to reform the intergovernmental machinery and decision making of the traditional multilateral system, but these alternative forums and modalities have not emerged to replace intergovernmental multilateralism. Rather, they complement and supplement existing multilateral institutions, enlarging their capacity and increasing their capability to respond to a range of global and transnational problems. Moreover, intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations have regained relevance in global governance by assuming "the role of nodal points in complex networks of governance emerging from the multitude of private-public partnerships now being developed . . . [and] by placing them[selves] at center stage in a new structure of world governance based on public-private partnerships organized along lines of overlapping networks of governance" (Bull, Bøås, McNeill 2004, 495).

Conclusion

Although the mix of actors is unsettled and the roles of states, nonstate actors, and international organizations are still being negotiated, there is little doubt that the institutions and structures of world order are in transition, moving from the international order established after World War II to a global order for the twenty-first century. A number of factors are driving the transition—structural changes in the international system; periodic crises and disasters (e.g., inter- and intrastate conflicts, economic collapse or depression, and catastrophic environmental events) that shock the system; shifts in the international system's characteristics or nature due to competitive pressures for resources and mandates, new and expanded norms, and domestic politics; and organizational leadership and learning—and creating distinctively new conditions and pressures for institutional change (Kapur 2002). One of the more important consequences of this transition has been the pluralization of international relations, which is causing the shift away from the state-centered institutional forms and mechanisms of governance and shaping the contours of twenty-first-century world politics. But, despite these pressures, most mechanisms for international decision making are exclusive to states, and governments continue to resist formalizing or institutionalizing the role and influence of nonstate actors in intergovernmental bodies or expanding the roles and powers of international organizations in contemporary international relations. While this arrangement is increasingly untenable in the complex global realities of today's world, the interstate system is not likely to relinquish its privileged position,

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though it may well be forced by circumstances to accept a role for nonstate actors and international organizations in the system of global governance.

The new dynamics of world politics arising out of this period of transition are forcing existing multilateral institutions to expand their institutional boundaries to manage relations among a wider set of global actors and creating the new mix of participants and roles in the structure and governance of the international system and order. Clearly, the cast of characters on the multilateral stage is large and growing, and the roles they play in contemporary world politics are both diverse and complex. Multilateralism encompasses this complexity; anchors the practices and means of interaction of states, nonstate actors, and international organizations; and enables states and nonstate actors to tackle transnational and global problems collectively and to realize common goals. In the end, perhaps most significant about multilateralism today is its salience in the evolution of the emerging global order and governance in the twenty-first century.

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